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Device-independent quantum cryptography allows security even if the devices used to execute
the protocol are untrusted - whether this is due to unknown imperfections in the implementation,
or because the adversary himself constructed them to subvert the security of the protocol. While
device-independence has seen much attention in the domain of quantum key distribution, relatively
little is known for general protocols. Here we introduce a new model for device-independence for
two-party protocols and position verification in the noisy-storage model. For the first time, we
show that such protocols are secure in the most general device-independent model in which the
devices may have arbitrary memory, states and measurements. In our analysis, we make use of a
slight modification of a beautiful new tool developed in [1] called “Entropy Accumulation Theorem”.
What’s more, the protocols we analyze use only simple preparations and measurements, and can
be realized using any experimental setup able to perform a CHSH Bell test. Specifically, security
can be attained for any violation of the CHSH inequality, where a higher violation merely leads to
a reduction in the amount of rounds required to execute the protocol.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Possibly the most well known application of quantum communication is quantum key distribution (QKD)[2, 3],
which allows Alice and Bob to protect their communication from the prying eyes of an eavesdropper. Yet quantum
communication offers advantages for the implementation of many other cryptographic tasks such as two-party cryp-
tography, and position based cryptography [4–9]. The goal of two-party cryptograph is to enable two parties, Alice
and Bob, to solve common problems without the need for mutual trust. Important examples of such problems include
the realization of private database access, or secure identification. The goal of position verification on the other hand
is certify that a protocol participant really does reside at a claimed location in space, such as an agent who will only
receive information if he is at a specific place.
Maybe not surprisingly, security for such tasks is more difficult to attain than for QKD, where Alice and Bob
can collaborate to check on the eavesdropper. In the realm of two-party protocols, Alice and Bob themselves do
not trust each other, and thus have no partner with whom to collaborate to check on the adversary’s behaviour.
Such a lack of collaboration has dire consequences, and it has been shown that even using quantum communication,
Alice and Bob cannot achieve security for two-party quantum protocols without making additional assumptions [10–
13]. Due to the practical importance of problems such as identification, however, one is generally willing to make
some assumptions in order to achieve security. Classically, one often relies on computational assumptions, i.e., that
solving a computational puzzle requires a larger amount of computing resources than are available to the adversary.
Computational assumptions are highly relevant in practise, although many well known assumptions are known to
become insecure once a quantum computer becomes available. Interestingly, however, it is also possible to make
physically motivated assumptions, for example that the adversary’s ability to store information is limited. This line
of assumptions was pioneered by Maurer [14], who considered an adversary who can only store a limited number of
classical bits. This assumption is known as the bounded-storage model. While conceptually greatly appealing, classical
storage is cheap and plentiful rendering this assumption less reliable. Most significantly, however, it was shown that
any protocol in which the honest parties store O(n) bits in order to run the protocol becomes insecure once the
adversary can store O(n2) bits [15]. Storing quantum information reliably, however, is an extremely difficult problem,
which motivated the so-called bounded-quantum storage [16, 17] or more generally noisy-storage model [18, 19].
Importantly, the noisy-storage model admits protocols that require no quantum storage for the honest execution and
that can be implemented in a manner similar to QKD using BB84 [18–20], six-state [21] or continuous variable [22]
encodings. Significantly, security can always be achieved as long as the number of qubits n sent in the protocol is
only slightly larger than the number of qubits r that the adversary can store, that is, whenever r . n−O(log n) [20],
which is essentially optimal. First implementations of bit commitment [23] and oblivious transfer [24] in the noisy-
storage model demonstrated their technological feasibility. What makes storage assumptions especially appealing is
that security remains preserved even if the adversary obtains a much better quantum storage device in the future,
making this assumption fully future proof.
Implementing quantum protocols in practise is a challenging undertaking. Even for relatively simple protocols
like QKD, many attacks on practical implementations have been found [25–30]. This motivates the study of device-
independent quantum cryptography, in which security can in principle be obtained even if the quantum devices are
entirely uncharacterized and possibly constructed by the adversary. Roughly speaking, device independent quantum
cryptography models each device as a black box. Inside box, the quantum state and measurements can be arbitrary,
and indeed the device may also have arbitrary memory of all previous rounds of a protocol. The only access to the
device is by its classical input output behaviour. We can instruct it to perform a certain measurement, by giving it
the desired measurement as a classical instruction (input), and observe the resulting classical measurement outcome
(output) [31]. Yet, there are no guarantees that the desired measurement is actually being performed. Curiously, it
turns out that in the quantum domain it is possible to obtain security purely by observing the input-output statistics
of such black boxes. The first clues to this were present already in [2], where it was shown that the violation of
a Bell [32] inequality is intimatelly linked to cryptographic security. Mayers and Yao [33, 34] went on to realise
that indeed quantum systems can be self-tested: certain quantum properties can be verified purely by observing the
classical input-output behaviour, which started the field of device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography. In DI
cryptography instead of assuming that we know how the devices work, we test them during the protocol by using
them to exhibit Bell nonlocality [35]. DI cryptography has been one of the most active research topics within quantum
cryptography, predominantly in the context of QKD [36–45] and randomness expansion or amplification [42–50].
In contrast, DI security has seen relatively little attention for general quantum protocols. A device independent
blind quantum computation scheme has been recently analyzed in [51]. In [52, 53], the DI security of a protocol
for imperfect coin flipping and weak bit commitments has been analysed. The spirit of these works differs form the
approach pursued here, in that we work in the noisy-storage model which allows the implementation of essentially
perfect two-party primitives under a realistic physical assumption. More recently, Adlam and Kent have proposed a
DI relativistic bit commitment protocol [54], which allows security for a fixed amount of time under the assumption
3that each party is split into space-like separated agents. We remark that in contrast to relativistic assumptions, we
only require the noisy-storage assumption to be valid for a short waiting time during the execution of the protocol.
A. Model
Constructing DI protocols for more general quantum cryptographic tasks brings additional challenges that require
both a careful modelling, as well as a different analysis than in QKD. The fact that Alice and Bob can check on Eve
in QKD, leads to a model in which Eve first prepares all the devices, and Alice and Bob then produce key simply
by giving inputs and collecting outputs. In particular, there is no quantum communication going back to Eve during
the execution of the protocol. This is in sharp contrast to DI in the realm of two-party cryptography, where the
correctness of the protocol requires that there is quantum communication going back to the adversary who prepared
the devices. Before stating our results let us thus first explain how we model DI in this setting.
As in QKD, we will always assume that the dishonest party prepares the devices. For our protocols, it will turn
out that indeed only Alice can be affected by faulty devices, and hence we will focus on the case of dishonest Bob.
Figure 1 summarizes the model.
Assumptions 1 (Device-independent model).
1. Bob can prepare the following devices Alice will use: the main device, the source and the testing device. These
devices can be fully malicious and exhibit arbitrary states and measurements, as well as correlations to the
previous rounds. The main measurement device takes one bit Θ ∈ {0, 1} and a state as input, and outputs one
bit X ′ ∈ {0, 1} while the the testing device takes one trit Θˆ ∈ {0, 1,⊥}, one bit T ∈ {0, 1} and a state as input,
and outputs a trit Y ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. The source prepares the quantum states.
2. We assume that Alice’s measurement devices cannot send any information outside her lab. This assumption is
also made in DI QKD, but we list it here explicitly.
3. We assume that Alice holds a device called switch to decide whether to test or to send the state to Bob. This
switch - i.e. the decision whether to test or not - is trusted.
4. We also assume that Alice can isolate the source from the measurement devices, so that the source cannot receive
any information from these devices. The source can only prepare and send the state to the switch. We remark
that we prove security in a more general model in which there is no outside source, but the device of Alice first
prepares the states of all rounds, and subsequently decides which rounds to measure or to pass to Bob. This is
precisely analogous to DI QKD in which the state is prepared essentially ahead of time in the analysis. However,
since we want protocols which require no memory to be implemented in practise, we use the source to explicitly
model that the states which are generated do not carry information about the previous rounds to Bob. Indeed,
we prove that any model in which there is no separated source and Alice’s device simply generates the quantum
states sequentially is necessarily insecure.
5. All classical operations that Alice performs are trusted. This is assumed in all DI quantum protocols.
B. Protocols
We first prove security of a cryptographic building block known as Weak String Easure [19] (see Figure 2). Weak
string erasure is universal in that it can be used to solve any other two-party cryptographic problem. Using classical
communication, we can easily obtain bit commitment, or given a quantum secure protocol for interactive hashing,
oblivious transfer. In essence, weak string erasure uses quantum communication to generate a simple form of classical
correlations which can then be turned into interesting tasks using classical communication. Our DI WSE protocol,
Protocol 11, is a combination of the simple BB84 based protocol for WSE presented in [19], with a DI test using the
CHSH inequality. We remark that our analysis is easily extended to a DI test using other Bell inequalities, including
higher dimensional ones. However, we focus on CHSH since it can indeed be implemented using merely qubit systems,
and reflects the qubit nature of the WSE protocol about which we like to gain DI confidence.
To state our results, we will take the simple case of a storage assumption in which Bob’s quantum memory has
a maximum dimension d. Our analysis can easily be extended to the regime of noisy-quantum storage, as we will
outline later. Specifically, we prove the following results.
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Figure 1. DI model in round i ∈ [n] of the protocol. The source creates a state ρAiBi = ΦAiBi and sends it to the switch. The
switch always sends the Ai system to the main device, but the Bi system either to the testing device (with probability µ) or
to Bob (with a probability 1− µ). The source is isolated from the measurement devices (see assumptions 1).
• Theorem (informal): Under the physical assumption that the adversary holds a noisy quantum storage Proto-
col 11 is secure with an min-entropy rate λ ≈ h− µ, where µ is the probability of testing, and h is a function of
the minimal number of CHSH games that have to be won during the execution of the protocol. See Theorem 12
for a precise statement.
• Theorem (informal): Under the physical assumption that the adversary holds “noisy entanglement” Protocol 18
is secure with Pcheat ≤ 2−κn being the probability that a cheater can trick the verifiers into falsely believing he
is at the claimed position. n is the number of rounds, and κ > 0 a constant which is depends on the minimal
number of CHSH games that have to be won during the execution of the protocol. See section III B 1 for a
precise statement.
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Figure 2. Weak String Erasure (WSE). If both Alice and Bob are honest, then Alice holds a random bit string Xn1 ∈ {0, 1}
n
while Bob should get (I, XI) where I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is a random subset of indices and XI is a substring of X
n
1 corresponding to
the indices in I. Security means that dishonest Alice cannot learn I, and Bob has high min-entropy about X - that is, while
holding XI it is difficult for him to guess the entire string X.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We denote HA the Hilbert space of the system A with dimension |A| and HAB := HA⊗HB the Hilbert space of the
composite system A and B, with ⊗ the tensor product. By L(H), Sa(H), P(H) and S(H) we mean the set of linear,
Hermitian, positive semidefinite and (quantum) density operators on H, respectively, S(H) ⊆ P(H) ⊆ Sa(H) ⊆ L(H).
For two operators A,B ∈ Sa(H), A ≥ B means (A − B) ∈ P(H). For M ∈ L(H), we denote |M | :=
√
M †M , and
the Schatten p-norm ‖M‖p := tr(|M |p)1/p for p ∈ [1,∞[. For M ∈ P(H), ‖M‖∞ is the largest eigenvalue of M . For
M ∈ P(H), M−1 is the general inverse of M , meaning that the relation MM−1M = M holds. If ρAB ∈ S(HAB)
then we denote ρA := trB(ρAB) and ρB := trA(ρAB) to be the respective reduced states. We use [n] as a shorthand
5for {1, . . . , n}. If we deal with a system composed of n subsystems A1, . . . , An, we use Aji (i, j ∈ [n] : i ≤ j) for
Ai, . . . , Aj . We write X ∈R X to indicate that a classical value X is chosen uniformly at random in a finite alphabet
X .
We use log(·) to denote the logarithm in base two while ln(·) is the natural logarithm.
For a bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, |x| denotes its length n and the Hamming weight wH(x) is the number of 1’s in x.
For a finite alphabet C, and for a random variable Cn1 on Cn, we write freq(Cn1) for the distribution over C defined by
freq(Cn1)(c) :=
|{i∈[n]:Ci=c}|
n , for any c ∈ C.
CPTP maps denotes Completely Positive and Trace Preserving maps, and LOCC denotes the set of Local Operation
and Classical Communication. POVM denotes a Positive-Operator Valued Measure which is a set of positive semi-
definite operators {Px} such that
∑
x Px = 1.
For two states ρ, σ ∈ S(H), we say that ρ ≈ǫ σ if the purified distance [55, Definition 3.8] between ρ and σ is less
than ǫ.
For classical-quantum states (or cq-states)
ρXA :=
∑
x∈X
px · |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρA|x, (1)
{px} is a probability distribution over the alphabet X of X . We define a cq-state ρXA|Ω conditioned on an event
Ω ⊂ X as,
ρXA|Ω :=
1
pΩ
∑
x∈Ω
px · |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρA|x, where pΩ :=
∑
x∈Ω
px. (2)
To generalise result in the noisy storage model (in Weak String Erasure), we use E
(1)
C (E) [56, Definition 10] being
the one shot entanglement cost to simulate a channel E : L(HA)→ L(HB) using LOCC and preshared entanglement
E
(1)
C (E) := minM,Λ{log(M) : ∀ρA ∈ L(HA), Λ(ρA ⊗Ψ
A¯B¯
M ) = E(ρA)} (3)
where Λ is a LOCC with AA¯ → 0 (no output) on Alice’s side and B¯ → B on Bob’s side, and M ∈ N. Note that we
require a single LOCC map to simulate the effect of the channel E so Λ must be independent of ρA.
Similarly to generalise our result to the noisy entanglement model (in PV) we will use E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρAB) being the one
shot entanglement cost to create a bipartite state ρAB from a maximally entangled state using only local operations
and classical communication. It is formally defined as
E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρ) := minM,Λ
{log(M) : Λ(ΨA¯B¯M ) = ρAB,Λ ∈ LOCC,M ∈ N}, (4)
where ΨA¯B¯M is a maximally entangled state of dimension M
ΨA¯B¯M := |ΨA¯B¯M 〉〈ΨA¯B¯M |, |ΨA¯B¯M 〉 :=
1√
M
M∑
i=1
|iA¯〉|iB¯〉. (5)
B. Markov Condition
All the statements in this work heavily rely on one condition, namely the Markov chain condition sometimes called
Markov condition.
Definition 2 (Markov condition). Let ρABC ∈ S(HABC) be a quantum state. We say that ρABC satifies the Markov
condition A↔ B ↔ C if and only if
I(A : C|B)ρ = 0, (6)
where I(A : C|B)ρ is the mutual information between A and C conditioned on B for the state ρABC .
This condition becomes trivial when A, B, and C are independent random variables. To know more about the
Markov condition see [1, Section 2.2 & Appendix C].
6C. Entropies
All along this work we use the smooth entropies defined as,
Definition 3. Let ρAB ∈ S(HAB) be a quantum state, and ǫ ∈ ]0, 1[. The min- and max-entropies of A conditioned
on B are defined as,
Hmin(A|B)ρ := − log
(
inf
σB
‖ρ 12ABσ
− 12
B ‖2∞
)
(7)
Hmax(A|B)ρ := log
(
sup
σB
‖ρ 12ABσ
− 12
B ‖21
)
(8)
and their smooth version as
Hǫmin(A|B)ρ := sup
ρˆAB
Hmin(A|B)ρˆ (9)
Hǫmax(A|B)ρ := inf
ρˆAB
Hmax(A|B)ρˆ, (10)
where the infimum and supremun over ρˆAB is taken in an ǫ-ball (in terms of the purified distance) centered in ρAB
in the set of sub-normalised states S≤(HAB), and σB ∈ S(HB). Note that if A is classical the optimisation can be
restricted to be in the set of states S(HAB) [55].
The min-entropy has a nice interpretation in terms of guessing probability.
Property 4 (see [57]). Let ρXA be a cq-state. We define the guessing probability Pguess(X |A) as follows
Pguess(X |A)ρ = max{PAx ,x∈X}
∑
x∈X
tr
(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx ρXA) , (11)
where the maximisation is done over all POVMs {PAx , x ∈ X} acting on HA. Then the min-entropy can be written as
Hmin(X |A)ρ = − log(Pguess(X |A)ρ). (12)
In order to bound these min- and max-entropies we sometimes need to use the sandwiched relative Rényi entropies.
Definition 5. For a state ρAB ∈ S(HAB) and for α ∈ ]0, 1[∪ ]1,∞[ the sandwiched α-Rényi entropy of A conditioned
on B is defined as
Hα(A|B)ρ = − α
α− 1 log
∥∥∥ρ 12ABρ−α−12αB ∥∥∥2
2α
. (13)
D. The Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT)
The Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) aims to relate the conditional ǫ-min-entropy of a n-subsystem state to
the Von Neumann entropy of each subsystem.
We recall here some of the useful definitions and theorems from [1], and prove a variant of the EAT which will be
handier to use afterwards.
The first result we recall is the Corollary 3.4 from [1].
Theorem 6 ([1], Corollary 3.4). Let ρR0A1B1 be a state, and M be a CPTP map from R0 to A2B2. Let us assume
that the state ρA1B1A2B2 := (M⊗ 1A1B1)(ρR0A1B1) satisfies the Markov condition A1 ↔ B1 ↔ B2. Then we have,
inf
ω
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)M(ω) ≤ Hα(A1A2|B1B2)ρ −Hα(A1|B1)ρ ≤ sup
ω
Hα(A2|B2A1B1)M(ω) (14)
where the supremum and the infimum are taken over all states ωR0A1B1 ∈ S(HR0A1B1).
Note that as for the remark 1 (below), if some registers are classical in ρR0A1B1 then they can be taken classical in
ωR0A1B1 .
Let us now write some necessary definitions, which will permit us to state the main theorem (the EAT) of [1]. For
i ∈ [n] let Mi be a CPTP map from Ri−1 to CiAiBiRi (where Ci is a classical register) that takes any input σRi−1R
7and outputs σCiAiBiRiR = (Mi ⊗ 1R)(σRi−1R).
The EAT below applies to states on the form,
ρCn1 An1Bn1 E = (trRn ◦Mn ◦ . . . ◦M1 ⊗ 1E)(ρR0E), (15)
where ρR0E ∈ S(HR0E). Moreover we demand that the state satisfies the following Markov condition
∀i ∈ [n], Ai−11 ↔ Bi−11 E ↔ Bi. (16)
Let P(C) be the set of distribution on the alphabet C of the classical register Ci, and R is a system isomorphic to
Ri−1. For any q ∈ P(C) we define the set of states
Σi(q) := {σCiAiBiRiR = (Mi ⊗ 1R)(ωRi−1R) : ω ∈ S(HRi−1 ⊗HR) & σCi = q} (17)
Definition 7. A real function f on P(C) is called a min-tradeoff function for a map Mi if
f(q) ≤ inf
σ∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)σ, (18)
and max-tradeoff function for a map Ni if
f(q) ≥ sup
σ∈Σi(q)
H(Ai|BiR)σ. (19)
If Σi(q) = ∅ then the infimum is taken to be +∞ and the supremum −∞.
Remark 1 (From [1] Remark 4.3). We can impose some constraints on the sets Σi(q) defined above. Indeed the
system R can be restricted to be isomorphic to Ai−11 B
i−1
1 E. We can also impose that for any register in ρ (as defined
above) that is classical, we can take it to be classical for all sates in Σi(q).
Let us now state the EAT as in [1] before modifying it.
Theorem 8 (EAT from [1] Theorem 4.4). Let M1, . . . ,Mn be CPTP maps from Ri−1 to CiAiBiRi (where Ci is
classical), and ρCn1 An1Bn1 E be a state such that (15), the Markov conditions (16), and the property that the classical
value Cn1 can be obtained by measuring the marginal ρAn1Bn1 hold. Let h ∈ R, and f be an affine min-tradeoff function
for M1, . . .Mn, and let ǫ ∈ ]0, 1[. Then, for any event Ω ⊂ Cn such that f(freq(Cn1 )) ≥ h,
Hǫmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≥ nh− v
√
n, (20)
where ρ|Ω = ρCn1 An1Bn1 E|Ω, and v = 2(log(1+2dA)+⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ · pΩ), where dA is the maximum dimension
of the system Ai. In the same way we have,
Hǫmax(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≤ nh˜+ v
√
n, (21)
when we replace f by an affine max-tradeoff function f˜ , such that the event Ω implies h˜ ≥ f˜(freq(Cn1 )).
Even though Theorem 8 is powerful, it is a bit inconvenient to apply for our applications. Indeed, to apply the
theorem directly we need that the classical value Cn1 can be obtained by measuring A
n
1B
n
1 , which will not necessarily
be true in our case. That is why we will state a variant of this theorem where we can circumvent this condition. Note
that the two versions are in fact equivalent, but we state the modified version here in order to clarify the upcoming
proofs.
Theorem 9 (Modified EAT). Let M1, . . . ,Mn be CPTP maps from Ri−1 to CiAiBiRi (where Ci is classical), let
ρCn1 An1Bn1 E be a state such that (15) and the Markov conditions
∀i ∈ [n], Ai−11 Ci−11 ↔ Bi−11 E ↔ Bi (22)
hold, let h ∈ R, and f be an affine min-tradeoff function for M1, . . .Mn, and let ǫ ∈ ]0, 1[. Then, for any event Ω ⊂ Cn
such that f(freq(Cn1 )) ≥ h,
Hǫmin(A
n
1C
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≥ nh− v
√
n, (23)
where v = 2(log(1 + 2dAdC) + ⌈‖∇f‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ · pΩ), where dA (respectively dC) is the maximum dimension of
the system Ai (respectively Ci). In the same way we have,
Hǫmax(A
n
1C
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω ≤ nh˜+ v
√
n, (24)
when we replace f by an affine max-tradeoff function f˜ , such that the event Ω implies h˜ ≥ f˜(freq(Cn1 )).
8Proof. Apply Theorem 8 with the following replacement:
∀i ∈ [n], Ai → AiCi (25a)
∀i ∈ [n], Bi → Bi (25b)
E → E (25c)
It is easy to see that Cn1 can be obtained by measuring A
n
1C
n
1B
n
1 since C
n
1 is a classical register contained in the
register An1C
n
1 B
n
1 , and the Markov condition (22) holds by assumption of the theorem, which justify that we can
apply the Theorem 8. Note that in the definitions of the tradeoff functions (Definition 7) we also need to do the
replacements (25a) and (25b).
The main advantage of Theorem 9 over the original EAT is that now we drop the restriction that it must be possible
to obtain Cn1 by measuring A
n
1B
n
1 .
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE EAT TO 2PC AND PV
A. Weak String Erasure
1. The protocol
Weak String Erasure (WSE) is a two-party cryptographic primitive introduced in [19]. In [8] it was proven that the
security of Position Verification can be derived from the security of WSE under some assumptions.
The goal of WSE is that at the end of the protocol, executed by the two parties Alice and Bob, Alice gets a random
string Xn1 and Bob gets a random set I ⊂ [n] of indices and the corresponding substring XI of Xn1 (see Figure 2).
Moreover we want the protocol to be secure meaning that Alice is ignorant about I, and that it is difficult for Bob to
guess the entire string Xn1 . For a formal definition of a (n, λ, ǫ)-WSE scheme we use [19, Definition 3.1].
Definition 10 ([19],Definition 3.1). An (n, λ, ǫ)-Weak String Erasure scheme is a protocol between two parties, Alice
and Bob, that satisfies the following properties:
Correctness: If Alice and Bob are honest, then the ideal state σXn1 IXI is defined such that
1. The joint distribution of the bit string Xn1 and the subset I is uniform:
σXn1 I =
1Xn1
2n
⊗ 1I
2n
. (26)
2. The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is close to the ideal state:
ρAB ≈ǫ σXn1 IXI , (27)
where (A,B) is identified with (Xn1 , IXI).
Security for Alice: If Alice is honest then there exists an ideal state σABˆ such that
1. The amount of information that Bob gets about Xn1 from Bˆ is limited:
Hmin(X
n
1 |Bˆ)σ ≥ λn. (28)
2. The joint state ρABˆ created by the real protocol is ǫ-close to the ideal sate:
ρABˆ ≈ǫ σXn1 Bˆ, (29)
where (A, Bˆ) is identified with (Xn1 , Bˆ).
Security for Bob: If Bob is honest, then there exists an ideal state σAˆXˆn1 I such that
1. The random variable I is independent of AˆXˆn1 and uniformly distributed over the set of subsets of [n]:
σAˆXˆn1 I = σAˆXˆn1 ⊗
1I
2n
(30)
92. The joint state ρAˆB created by the real protocol is equal to the ideal state:
ρAˆB = σAˆ(XˆII), (31)
where (Aˆ, B) is identified with (Aˆ, XˆII).
We present now the Protocol 11 that implements a Device Independent Weak String Erasure (DI WSE). The DI WSE
protocol consists of a standard Weak String Erasure protocol in which some rounds, randomly chosen, are used to
certify the devices. This certification is made by performing a CHSH test between two spatially separated devices on
Alice’s side. The CHSH test allows to ensure security against a dishonest Bob with bounded quantum storage even
in the paranoid scenario where Alice cannot trust her devices.
Protocol 11 (Device Independent Weak String Erasure). When the two parties are honest, the protocol runs as
follows (see figure 1)
1. For i ∈ [n] (where n is the total number of rounds in the protocol),
(a) Alice uses her source to produce an EPR pair ρAiBi = ΦAiBi and sends it to her switch.
(b) She chooses at random a bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} (such that Ti has a probability µ to be one), and inputs it in her
switch. The switch sends the A part to the main device. If Ti = 1 then the switch sends ρBi to Alice’s
testing device and |⊥〉〈⊥| to Bob. Else it sends ρBi to Bob and |⊥〉〈⊥| to the testing device. The register
going from the switch to the testing device is called B¯i and the one going to Bob is called Bˆi.
(c) Just after the switch has sent the B part to Bob or to the testing device, Alice inputs a randomly chosen
bit Θi ∈R {0, 1} and Θ¯i ∈ {0, 1,⊥} in her main and testing devices respectively such that{
Θ¯i ∈R {0, 1} if Ti = 1
Θ¯i = ⊥ if Ti = 0.
The main device is supposed to measure in the standard basis for Θi = 0 and in the Hadamard basis when
Θi = 1 while the testing device is supposed to measure in the basis {cos π8 |0〉−sin π8 |1〉 ; cos 3π8 |0〉+sin 3π8 |1〉}
for Θ¯i = 1 and in {cos π8 |0〉+sin π8 |1〉 ; cos 3π8 |0〉− sin 3π8 |1〉} for Θ¯i = 0. When Θ¯i = ⊥ the testing device
just outputs ⊥. To sum up the main device produces the outcome X ′i ∈ {0, 1} and the testing device produces
Yi ∈ {0, 1,⊥} where, {
Yi ∈ {0, 1} if Ti = 1
Yi = ⊥ if Ti = 0
(d) Alice classically computes a value Ci ∈ {0, 1,⊥} as follows:

{
Ci = 1 if X
′
i ⊕ Yi = Θi · Θ¯i
Ci = 0 else
if Ti = 1
Ci = ⊥ if Ti = 0
(e) After that, Alice classically post-processes the value of X ′i: If Ti = 0 then she does nothing, X
′
i stays
unchanged, and if Ti = 1 then she changes X
′
i and replaces its value by ⊥. Let’s call now the post processed
bit Xi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
(f) When he receives the state ρBˆi from Alice, if Ti = 0 Bob measures it according to a randomly chosen basis
Θˆi ∈R {0, 1} and gets the output Xˆi ∈ {0, 1}. When Ti = 1 Bob just sets Xˆi = ⊥. Note that Bob measures
either in the standard or the Hadamard bases. Then we can see that if Θi = Θˆi Alice and Bob measure the
same outcome, i.e. Xi = Xˆi.
2. Alice computes the fraction of CHSH games that are won:
ω :=
|{i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1 & Ci = 1}|
|{i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1}| .
Alice aborts the protocol if ω < δ, for some fixed parameter δ ∈] 34 , 12 + 12√2 [.
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3. Bob counts how many test rounds there was,
ω′ := |{i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1}|. (32)
If ω′ > µn+
√
n ln(1/ǫ)2 = n− n˜ Bob aborts the protocol.
4. Alice and Bob wait for a predetermined duration ∆t before Alice sends to Bob the list of bases Θn1 she has input
in her main device. When Bob receives Θn1 he computes the set of indices I := {i ∈ [n] : Θi = Θˆi & Ti = 0},
and erases all the bits of Xˆn1 whose index are not in I. Bob finally has (I, XI). Alice computes her bits string
Xk1 by erasing all the bits in X
n
1 that are ⊥.
We will assume here that if one of the two parties aborts the protocol, then this party will output the maximally
mixed state (independently of all the previous communication). This permits to satisfy the security condition when
a honest party aborts.
Let us now summarise our result in Theorem 12 whose proof is given later in Lemmas 13, 14 and 15.
Theorem 12. The Protocol 11 implements a Device Independent (k, λ, 2ǫ)-WSE scheme with,
n˜ ≤ k ≤ n, where n˜ := (1− µ)n−
√
n
ln(1/ǫ)
2
and n is the number of rounds of the protocol.
The value of k depends on how many test rounds there are during the protocol. The number n˜ is chosen
such that for two honest parties the probability that one of them aborts is very low.
λ = h− µ− v¯(ǫ)√
n
+
3 log
(
1−√1− (ǫ/4)2)− log(d)
n
, where h := (1− µ)1− (4δ − 2)
√
16δ(1− δ)− 2
2
,
ǫ ∈]0, 1[ being a security parameter,
µ ∈]0, 1[ is the testing probability,
δ ∈] 3
4
,
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
[ is a threshold,
where v¯(ǫ) := 2(log(19)+⌈‖∇f¯‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ2)+2 log(7)
√
− log(ǫ2(1−√1− (ǫ/4)2)), f¯ is the affine min-tradeoff
function defined by (42), and d is an upper bound on the dimension (or the one shot entanglement cost) of a dishonest
Bob’s quantum memory. Our proof are given against an adversary whose quantum memory is bounded in dimension
by d. Nevertheless we can extend the result to a noisy storage model by using the arguments given in [9], where d is
now a bound on the one shot entanglement cost of the dishonest Bob’s quantum memory i.e. E
(1)
C (E) ≤ d, where E is
the channel representing Bob’s memory.
Proof. Lemma 13 proves the 2ǫ-correctness of the protocol, Lemma 14 proves security for Bob, and Lemma 15 proves
security for Alice.
The idea to extend the result to a noisy storage model is to use the definition of the one shot entanglement cost (3) of
a channel (here the channel will be Bob’s memory) which tells us that any channel whose one shot entanglement cost
is bounded by d can be simulated by to a bounded channel of dimension d and LOCC. This means that any strategy
using a memory whose entanglement cost is bounded by d can be simulated by an other strategy using a bounded
memory (bounded in dimension by d), and then our security proofs also holds for the noisy storage model.
2. Correctness
The following lemma proves that the Protocol 11 is 2ǫ-correct.
Lemma 13. The Protocol 11 is 2ǫ-correct meaning that if the protocol does not aborts then it is correct, and that the
protocol aborts with a probability at most 2ǫ.
Proof. It is clear that for honest Alice and Bob, if they do not abort the protocol then Alice has a string Xk1 ∈ {0, 1}k
and Bob has (I, XI) where I is a subset of [k] and XI is the corresponding substring of Xk1 . Moreover if the protocol
does not abort we have n ≥ k ≥ n˜. It it is then sufficient to prove that the probability that Alice aborts is less than
ǫ and that the probability that Bob aborts is less than ǫ.
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For Alice: Remember that Alice aborts if ω < δ. Also if Alice and Bob are honest the state they will measure is Φ⊗n
a tensor product of EPR pairs and all the measurement are the same for all rounds, so we can just multiply
the probability for each testing rounds. Also each round has a probability µ to be a testing round. Then the
probability that w < δ is given by
PAlice aborts :=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
µk(1− µ)n−k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability that there
are k testing rounds
δ·k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability that there
are less that δ · k wins for k
testing rounds
, where p :=
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
. (33)
Using Hoeffding’s inequality we have
δ·k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
pj(1− p)k−j ≤ exp(−2(p− δ)2k) =
(
e−2(p−δ)
2
)k
, (34)
and thus:
PAlice aborts ≤
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
µ e−2(p−δ)
2
)k
(1− µ)n−k (35)
=
(
1− µ
(
1− e−2(p−δ)2
))n
, (36)
where the last equality comes from the binomial theorem. So for n ≥ ln(ǫ)
ln(1−µ(1−e−2(p−δ)2 )) , PAlice aborts ≤ ǫ. 
For Bob: Again if Alice and Bob are honest Ti follows a Bernoulli distribution, and each round is independent from
the others. Thus, because Bob aborts if ω′ ≥ µn +
√
n ln(1/ǫ)2 , the probability that he aborts the protocol is
given by
PBob aborts :=
n∑
k=µn+
√
n ln(1/ǫ)2
(
n
k
)
µk(1 − µ)n−k (37)
and using Hoeffding inequality we get
PBob aborts ≤ exp

−2
(√
ln(1/ǫ)
2n
)2
n

 = ǫ. (38)

Thus the probability that either Alice or Bob abort the protocol (for n ≥ ln(ǫ)
ln(1−µ(1−e−2(p−δ)2 )) ) is less than 2ǫ which
ends the proof of the 2ǫ-correctness of protocol 11.
3. Security for Bob
We argue in this section that Protocol 11 is secure device independently for Bob.
Lemma 14. Protocol 11 is secure for a honest Bob.
Proof. It is very intuitive that Alice is ignorant about I. To see that note that the set I that Bob has at the end
of Protocol 11 is completely determined by Θn1 and Θˆ
n
1 . More precisely the set of indices I can be defined as being
the set of indices for which the corresponding trits of the string Θn1 ⊕ Θˆn1 are zero (where ⊕ is the bit wise addition
modulo 2, and as Θˆi can be ⊥ we take the convention that Θi ⊕ ⊥ = ⊥). So as Alice knows the string Θn1 , it is
equivalent for her to guess I or the value of Θˆi ∈ {0, 1} for all i being a non-testing round (for the testing rounds she
already knows that Θˆi = ⊥). But for the non-testing rounds Bob chooses Θˆi independently and uniformly at random
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in {0, 1}, and he never sends any information to Alice, so the state between Alice and Bob (tracing out all irrelevant
registers) must be
ρAI = ρA ⊗ 1I
2k
(39)
meaning that Alice gains no information about the set of indices I.
To complete the proof we need to define state (30) (for more details see Ref. [19]). For the case where Bob’s device
perform projective measurements the proof follows straightforwardly as in Ref. [19]. However note that we do not
want to make any assumption about Bob’s device, and we even allow that Alice prepares his device. Therefore in the
most general scenario we may assume that Bob’s device perform imperfect measurements or general POVMs. This
scenario can be modelled as a Weak String Erasure with Errors (WSEE) [58], and condition (39) guarantees security
for this more general case as shown in Ref. [58].
Note that since we do not make any assumption on Bob’s device, this is a device independent security proof for a
honest Bob (against Alice).
4. Security for Alice
In this section we want to show that the Protocol 11 is secure for Alice. The proof is given in Lemma 15.
When Bob is dishonest, he does not necessarily measure the system Bˆn1 he receives from Alice, instead he applies
a general CPTP map EBˆn1→B˜K to it, where K is an arbitrary classical register, and B˜ is a quantum register whose
dimension is bounded by d (bounded quantum memory). When Bob receives Θn1 from Alice after the duration ∆t,
Bob applies a CPTP map DB˜K→X˜n1 where is a classical register X˜
n
1 representing his guess for the entire string X
n
1 of
Alice.
We want to prove now that in the Protocol 11 either the min-entropy Hǫmin(X
k
1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω is high or the protocol
aborts with a high probability (at least 1− ǫ), where Ω is the event corresponding to ω ≥ δ or equivalently Alice does
not abort the protocol in step 2.
For that we first note that,
Hǫmin(X
k
1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω = Hǫmin(Xn1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω ≥ Hǫmin(Xn1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω − log(|B˜|) (40)
≥ Hǫmin(Xn1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω − log(d) (41)
The first equality coming form the fact that the only difference between Xn1 and X
k
1 , is that X
n
1 contains
some additional ⊥ values corresponding to the testing rounds determined by T n1 . Now we just need to bound
Hǫmin(X
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω . This basically means that we are interested in bounding the min-entropy for an purely classi-
cal adversary Bob. In other words we replace Bob’s maps by EBn1→K and DKΘn1→X˜n1 , where now there is no quantum
register at all. In the following we will only consider such a classical Bob.
We can think about Alice’s measurements as a composition of maps N1, . . . ,Nn as described in figure 3, and where
the maps Ni are described in the figure 4. The global state before Bob makes his guess can then be written as
ρCn1Xn1 Y n1 Θ¯n1Θn1 Tn1 K = (trRn ◦Nn ◦ . . . ◦ N1 ⊗ 1K)(ρR0K), where R0 := An1 B¯n1 (see figure 3). We prove in the appendix
A that the function f defined as,
∀q ∈ P({0, 1,⊥}), f(q) := (1− µ)1− (4p− 2)
√
16p(1− p)− 2
2
, where p :=
q(1)
1− q(⊥) , (42)
is a convex min-tradeoff function for the maps N1, . . . ,Nn, and hence its differential function f¯ at the point q =
(1− (1 + δ)µ, µδ, µ)t (where t is the transpose) is an affine min-tradeoff function.
Lemma 15. At the end of the Protocol 11 we are in one of the following situations:
1. The min-entropy Hǫmin(X
k
1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω is bounded as follows:
Hǫmin(X
k
1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω ≥ (h− µ)n− v¯(ǫ)
√
n+ 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)− log(d) (43)
where h := (1− µ)1−(4δ−2)
√
16δ(1−δ)−2
2 and
v¯(ǫ) := 2(log(19) + ⌈‖∇f¯‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ2) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(ǫ2(1 −√1− (ǫ/4)2)).
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S
switch
ρBn1
ρAn1
Tn1
Tn1
ρB¯n1
ρ
Bˆn1
K
R0
N1 Nn ρCn1 Xn1 Y n1 Θ¯n1Θn1 Tn1
T1 Tn
Figure 3. Diagram representing Alice and Bob’s operations when Bob is dishonest. In this figure Alice produces all the n
systems at the same time using the source S, and then according to the random string Tn1 ∈ {0, 1}
n she chooses which ones
she sends to Bob. Proving security for such a protocol also proves it for the Protocol 11 under the assumption 1. After she
sent the information to Bob she can measure her system that we call R0 := A
n
1 B¯
n
1 . The operations she makes are modeled by
the maps N1, . . . ,Nn described in more details in the figure 4. When Bob receives the system Bˆ
n
1 he measures it, which gives
him the classical value K.
Ni
Ei Di
Ai
Ti
Ri−1 Ri, Ci
Θi
Θ¯i
X ′i
post
process
Ti
Xi
Yi
Θi
Θ¯i
Ti
Ti
Tn1
Figure 4. Description of the map Ni. Θi ∈ {0, 1} represents the “basis” in which the device Ai measures its input to get the
output X ′i ∈ {0, 1} which will be post-processed afterwards into Xi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. This device represents Alice’s main device.
Θ¯i ∈ {0, 1,⊥} represents the “basis” in which the “testing” device Ti measures its input to get the output Yi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. If
Ti = 0 we have Θ¯i = ⊥ and then Yi = ⊥: this corresponds to the non tested rounds. Else Θ¯i, Yi ∈ {0, 1}. If Ti = 0 then
Ci = ⊥, else Ci = 0 if (Θi, Θ¯i, Xi, Yi) do not verify the CHSH condition and Ci = 1 when they do.
2. Alice aborted the protocol with a probability at least 1− ǫ.
Proof. First note that the state ρCn1Xn1 Y n1 Θ¯n1Θn1 Tn1 K clearly satisfies the following Markov condition,
∀i ∈ [n], X i1Ci1 ↔ Θi1T i1K ↔ Θi+1Ti+1, (44)
since each bit of the strings Θn1 and T
n
1 are chosen independently at random. We can now apply Theorem 9 with the
replacements
∀i ∈ [n], Ai → Xi (45)
∀i ∈ [n], Ci → Ci (46)
∀i ∈ [n], Bi → ΘiTi (47)
E → K (48)
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and the affine min-tradeoff function f¯ to lower bound Hǫmin(X
n
1 C
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω :
Hǫmin(X
n
1 C
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≥ nh− v
√
n, (49)
where h := (1− µ)1−(4δ−2)
√
16δ(1−δ)−2
2 and v := 2(log(19) + ⌈‖∇f¯‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ · pΩ). It is easy to check that for
the event Ω (which correspond to ω ≥ δ) f¯(freq(Cn1 )) ≥ (1−µ)1−(4δ−2)
√
16δ(1−δ)−2
2 =: h which justifies the inequality
(49).
Then by using the chain rule for min-entropy from [55, Equation (6.57)] we have,
Hǫmin(X
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≥ Hǫ/4min(Xn1 Cn1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω −Hǫ/4max(Cn1 |Xn1Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω + 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2) (50)
≥ Hǫ/4min(Xn1 Cn1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω −Hǫ/4max(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω + 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2). (51)
It just remains us to upper bound H
ǫ/4
max(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω which is done in the appendix B:
Hǫ/4max(C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≤ µn+ n(α− 1) log2(7) +
α
α− 1 log
(
1
pΩ
)
− log(1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)
α− 1 (52)
≤ µn+ n(α− 1) log2(7)− log(p
2
Ω(1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2))
α− 1 . (53)
Taking α = 1 +
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1−(ǫ/4)2))
n log2(7)
gives us,
Hǫ/4max(C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≤ µn+ 2
√
n log(7)
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)). (54)
Combining equations (49) (51) and (54)we get,
Hǫmin(X
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≥ (h− µ)n− v˜
√
n+ 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2), (55)
where v˜ := 2(log(19) + ⌈‖∇f¯‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ · pΩ) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(p2Ω(1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)).
Now if the probability pΩ that the event Ω happens is such that pΩ ≥ ǫ then the previous inequality becomes,
Hǫmin(X
n
1 |Θn1T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≥ (h− µ)n− v¯(ǫ)
√
n+ 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2), (56)
and by combining it with (41) we have,
Hǫmin(X
n
1 |Θn1T n1 KB˜)ρ|Ω ≥ (h− µ)n− v¯(ǫ)
√
n+ 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)− log(d) (57)
where v¯(ǫ) := 2(log(19)+ ⌈‖∇f¯‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(ǫ2) + 2 log(7)
√
− log(ǫ2(1−√1− (ǫ/4)2)). On the contrary if pΩ < ǫ
this means (by definition of Ω) that Alice aborts the protocol with probability at least 1− ǫ and we are in the second
case of the theorem.
B. Position Verification (PV)
1. The Protocol
Position Verification (PV) is a protocol where one Prover (P) tries to convince two Verifiers (V1 and V2) that he
stands at some claimed geographical position (Figure 5). In this paper we limit the analysis to the case of a one
dimensional space.
It is known that for a purely classical PV no security is achievable [59], and for a quantum version it is shown that
a fully powerful adversary can always cheat at the protocol [6, 7]. However we can have security under the realistic
assumption that the adversary (composed of two malicious provers that we call M1 and M2) has a bounded amount
of entanglement [8, 60]. Most of the previous security proofs rely on the fact that the state and the measurements
done during the protocol by the Verifiers are known and trusted or are assumed to be IID. Here we will present a
protocol that implements a secure PV even when the measurements are unknown and not trusted, meaning that the
security still holds if the adversary prepares the Verifiers’ devices.
In order to get an intuition on the problem, we start by informally defining the cheating probability for a Position
Verification protocol.
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V1 P V2
M¯V1 ⊗ 1P
Θn1
Xi
ρPn1
MP
Θn1
X¯n1 X¯
n
1
 
∆t
Figure 5. Spacetime diagram. V1 uses Θ
n
1 as input to his main device in order to measure sequentially the first subsystem
of the bipartite state ρV 1n1 Pn1 . The outputs of the measurements are recorded in string X
n
1 ∈ {0, 1,⊥}
n. V1 then sends the
subsystems ρPn1 to the prover P . At the same time V2 sends Θ
n
1 to P . Upon receiving the state ρPn1 and string Θ
n
1 , P performs
sequential measurements obtaining X¯n1 ∈ {0, 1,⊥}
n. He sends X¯n1 to both verifiers. The verifiers check whether X¯
n
1 = X
n
1 ,
and the time taken to receive an answer from P .
Definition 16 (Informal). The probability PcheatPV that two dishonest provers M1 and M2 succeed to cheat at the
protocol, meaning that they pass the protocol while none of them is at the claimed position, is defined as the maximum
probability that they both guess V1’s bit string Xn1 . The maximum is taken over all possible strategies they can have.
A strategy is compose of an entangled state ρM1M2 and two pairs of CPTP maps (E1,D1) and (E2,D2) (see Figure 6
in section III B 2).
Now we state the requirements for a secure PV protocol.
Definition 17. A PV protocol is called secure if either
• the protocol aborts with a probability 1− pΩ exponentially close to one:
1− pΩ ≥ 1− ǫn,
where ∃α > 0 : ǫn = 2−αn and n is the number of rounds of the protocol.
• or the probability PcheatPV (see Definition 16) is such that
∃κ > 0, PcheatPV ≤ 2−κn (58)
for n big enough, where n is the number of rounds of the protocol.
We now present our Device-independent Position Verification protocol. The protocol consists of a standard PV
protocol with additional randomly chosen test rounds, similar to the one introduced in Protocol 11, where the provers
check the number of CHSH games that are won to prevent any malicious behavior of the devices.
Protocol 18. The honest execution of PV runs as follows (see Figure 5).
1. For i ∈ [n],
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(a) The Verifier 1 (V1) uses his source to produce an EPR pair ρV 1iPi = ΦV 1iPi and sends it to his switch.
(b) • V1 chooses at random a bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} (such that Ti has a probability µ to be one) and inputs it in
his switch. The switch sends the V1 part to the main device. If Ti = 1 then the switch sends ρPi to
V1’s testing device and |⊥〉〈⊥| to the Prover P. Else it sends ρPi to the Prover P and |⊥〉〈⊥| to the
testing device. The register that goes to V1’s testing device is called P¯i and the one going to the Prover
is called Pˆi.
• At the same time V2 sends to the Prover the choice of basis Θi in which V1 will measure his state
ρV 1i with his main device.
(c) Just after the switch has sent the {Pi}i∈[n] part to the Prover or to the testing device, V1 inputs the
randomly chosen bits Θi ∈R {0, 1} and Θ¯i ∈ {0, 1,⊥} in his main and testing devices respectively such that,{
Θ¯i ∈R {0, 1} if Ti = 1
Θ¯i = ⊥ if Ti = 0
The main device is supposed to make a measurement in the standard basis for Θi = 0 and in the Hadamard
basis for Θi = 1, while the testing device is supposed to measure in the basis {cos π8 |0〉−sin π8 |1〉 ; cos 3π8 |0〉+
sin 3π8 |1〉} for Θ¯i = 1 and in {cos π8 |0〉 + sin π8 |1〉 ; cos 3π8 |0〉 − sin 3π8 |1〉} for Θ¯i = 0. When Θ¯i = ⊥ the
testing device just outputs ⊥. To sum up, the main device produces the outcome X ′i ∈ {0, 1} and the testing
device produces Yi ∈ {0, 1,⊥} where, {
Yi ∈ {0, 1} if Ti = 1
Yi = ⊥ if Ti = 0
(d) V1 classically computes a value Ci ∈ {0, 1,⊥} as follows:

{
Ci = 1 if X
′
i ⊕ Yi = Θi · Θˆi
Ci = 0 else
if Ti = 1
Ci = ⊥ if Ti = 0
(e) After that, V1 classically post-processes the value of X ′i: If Ti = 0 then he does nothing, X
′
i stays unchanged,
and if Ti = 1 then he changes X
′
i and replaces its value by ⊥. Let’s call now the post processed bit
Xi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
2. Each time P receives a state ρPˆi from V1 and the corresponding Θi from V2, he uses the bit Θi to measure the
state in the same basis as V1 does with his main device (we adopt the convention here that measuring |⊥〉〈⊥|
outputs ⊥ independently of the basis Θi). Just after he measures, P sends back his outcome measurement to
both verifiers.
3. V1 computes the fraction
ω :=
|{i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1 & Ci = 1}|
|{i ∈ [n] : Ti = 1}| .
V1 aborts the protocol if ω < δ, for some fixed parameter δ ∈] 34 , 12 + 12√2 [. We call Ω the event of not aborting.
4. • The two Verifiers check that the Prover replied within a duration ∆t.
• For each round i in which Ti = 0 they check whether the Prover’s outcome measurement agrees with V1’s
one.
5. The Verifiers accept that the prover is at the claimed position if the two previous conditions are satisfied. We
say that the prover passes the protocol.
As for WSE we will assume that when aborting V1 outputs a maximally mixed state for Xn1 .
It is easy to check that, conditioned on the fact that the protocol does not abort, an honest prover always passes the
protocol. In the exact same way as WSE we can prove that for an honest implementation of Protocol 18 is ǫ-correct,
meaning that the protocol aborts with a probability less that ǫ and when it does not abort a honest prover always
passes the protocol.
Let us summarise our result on PV in the following theorem.
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Theorem 19 (Informal). Under the Assumptions 20 (below), the Protocol 18 implements a secure Device-Independent
Position Verification scheme. This means that the protocol is ǫ-correct and secure. Saying that it is ǫ-correct means
that for a honest prover, the protocol abort with a probability less than ǫ, and is correct if it does not abort. And we
say that the protocol is secure if it satisfies all the requirements of Definition 17.
The ǫ-correctness of the protocol follows straightforwardly as we argued before. The security of the protocol will
be proven in Lemma 21 below.
Remark 2 (On Theorem 19). Note that even though Theorem 19 seems to be an asymptotic statement, our proofs
can also give bounds for the finite regime, where an appropriate choice of values of κ and n can provide security with
any desired security parameter. Here we only focus on a security proof for PV, but a finite regime analysis can be
obtained from the parameters of WSE.
2. Security
∆t
x
t
V1 M1 M2 V2
M¯V1
⊗ 1P
Xn1
Θn1
ρ
Pˆn1
E1
◦ ◦
ρM1M2 Θn1
E2
D1 D2
Y n1 Z
n
1
 
Figure 6. Strategy for the two cheaters M1 and M2. The choice of the state ρM1M2 and of the two pairs of CPTP maps (E1,D1)
and (E2,D2) constitute the strategy for M1 and M2. The maps Di, i ∈ [2] output classical register Y
n
1 and Z
n
1 . In our model
of attack M1 and M2 are not allowed to have quantum communication. Also as stated in Assumptions 20 we will assume that
the state ρM1M2 has a local dimension bounded by d. We say that the cheaters cheat at the protocol or succeed the attack if
Y n1 = Z
n
1 = X
n
1 .
A malicious prover M alone cannot cheat at the protocol, meaning that he cannot pass the protocol without being
at the claimed position. Indeed, because a message cannot go faster than the speed of light, if he tries to cheat he
will never be able to reply to both verifiers on time because he is further away (compared to the claimed position)
from one of the two verifiers. However we can wonder what happens if there is several malicious provers trying to
impersonate one honest prover at the claimed position. In one dimension we can without loss of generality assume
that there is at most to malicious provers M1 and M2.
Our goal is to prove that Protocol 18 is secure against two malicious provers (M1 and M2) trying to impersonate
an honest prover at the claimed position (see Figure 6). To do so we will make use of the security result we have for
WSE. Indeed, as proved in Ref. [8], the security of WSE implies security for PV for the case where the two malicious
provers do not have access to quantum channels. These assumptions are formalized below.
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Assumptions 20.
1. The two malicious provers share a bipartite state ρM1M2 whose one shot entanglement cost is bounded:
E
(1)
C,LOCC(ρM1M2) ≤ d.
2. The two malicious prover do not have any quantum channel. However they can have an arbitrary classical
channel. They can also have arbitrary large quantum and classical memory.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. The Lemma 21 proves security for the Protocol 18 under
the Assumptions 1, where V1 plays the role of Alice, and the Assumptions 20.
Lemma 21. The Protocol 18 is secure.
Sketch of Proof. As in the previous section if the probability pΩ that V1 does not abort is such that pΩ < ǫn = 2
−αn,
then the protocol aborts with a probability at least 1− ǫn = 1− 2−αn.
Now let’s consider the case where pΩ ≥ ǫn and the protocol does not abort, then the state that Alice and Bob share
is ρ|Ω i.e. the state conditioned on the event Ω. In [8] it is proven that, under the Assumptions 20, PcheatPV can be
linked to the probability PcheatWSE := 2
−Hmin(Xn1 |Bob)ρ|Ω that a dishonest Bob cheats at an (n, λ, ǫ)-WSE:
PcheatPV ≤ PcheatWSE = 2−Hmin(X
n
1 |Bob)ρ|Ω , (59)
where “Bob” refers to all quantum and classical information that Bob has at the end of WSE (before he makes a guess
forXn1 ). In the previous section on Weak String Erasure we had a bound on the smooth min-entropyH
ǫ
min(X
n
1 |Bob)ρ|Ω
and thanks to Lemma 30 of Appendix D we can link the smooth min-entropy with the min-entropy as follows,
2
−Hmin(Xn1 |Bob)ρ|Ω ≤ ǫn + 2−H
ǫn
min(X
n
1 |Bob)ρ|Ω . (60)
Then using Lemma 31 (the lower bound on the smooth min-entropy (43) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 31 since
α can be taken arbitrarily small), we have
∃κ > 0 : 2−Hmin(Xn1 |Bob)ρ|Ω ≤ 2−κn (61)
which proves the security for PV.
IV. CONCLUSION
Here we have considered Weak String Erasure and Position Verification in the noisy-storage model (or noisy-
entanglement model). We have proved security of WSE and PV in the most paranoid scenario where the devices
used to create or measure states are not trusted (device-independent scenario). This implies the device-independent
security of any two-party cryptographic protocol that can be made from WSE and classical communications, and
certain position-based cryptographic tasks.
Our proof techniques are based on the recently proven Entropy Accumulation Theorem [1].
We stress that the security of our protocols can be achieved for any violation of the CHSH inequality, under the
cost of increasing the number of rounds required to execute the protocol. Moreover, for the maximal violation of the
CHSH inequatility our bound on the min-entropy is essentially tight (it grows like n2 , which is the amount achieved
by the honest strategy). However we did not look at tightness of our bound for other values of the violation.
Our result constitutes the first device independent security proof on two-party cryptography and Position Verifica-
tion where no IID assumption is made. Together with the fact that we prove security for any violation of the CHSH
inequality, this opens the door to the experimental realization of many quantum cryptographic protocols in the most
adversarial scenario.
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Appendix A: min-tradeoff function
We prove here that the function f defined as,
∀q ∈ P({0, 1,⊥}), f(q) := (1− µ)1− (4p− 2)
√
16p(1− p)− 2
2
, where p :=
q(1)
1− q(⊥) , (A1)
is a convex min-tradeoff function for the maps N1, . . . ,Nn defined in Figure 4. The convexity is easy to check so we
will focus on proving that f is a min-tradeoff function for the maps N1, . . . ,Nn. We prove it in Lemma 25.
Before we state the Lemma 25 we first need to define the effective anti-commutator [61] and the absolute effective
anti-commutator [62] of two observables.
Definition 22. For a state ωAB and two binary measurements acting on system A associated to the observables A0
and A1 the effective anti-commutator is defined as,
ǫ :=
1
2
tr({A0, A1}ωA), (A2)
and the absolute effective anti-commutator is
ǫ+ :=
1
2
tr(|{A0, A1}|ωA). (A3)
These two quantities are measures of how much (in)compatible two measurements are. If ǫ = 0 or ǫ+ = 0 then the
measurements associated to the observables A0 and A1 are maximally incompatible. When |ǫ| = 1 or ǫ+ = 1 then the
measurement are compatible and then there is no uncertainty on the measurement outcomes. They also have another
nice property, namely they can be related to the probability of winning a CHSH game [61, 62].
Property 23. Let ωAB be a bipartite state, A0, A1 two observables acting on the system A, and B0, B1 two observables
acting on B. We define the CHSH value to be S := tr(WωAB), where W := A0 ⊗B0 +A0 ⊗B1 +A1⊗B0 −A1 ⊗B1.
The following inequalities hold
|ǫ| ≤ ǫ+ ≤ S
4
√
8− S2 =: ζ, (A4)
where ǫ and ǫ+ are respectively the effective anti-commutator and the absolute effective anti-commutator as defined
above. The first inequality comes from the fact that for any hermitian operator O and for any state ω we have
| tr(Oω)| ≤ tr(|O|ω), the second inequality comes from the result of Ref. [62].
It is well known that the CHSH value is linked to the probability of success in a CHSH game [35] as:
p =
1
2
+
S
8
, (A5)
where p is the probability to win the CHSH game. Therefore we can express ζ in terms of p:
ζ = (4p− 2)
√
16p(1− p)− 2.
This property is important because it permits us to link the “(in)compatibility” of two measurements to the number
of times we can win a CHSH game. In other words, by playing many CHSH games and counting the number of wins
we can have an idea on how much (in)compatible two unknown measurements are. Note that because we do not use
IID assumption, we cannot really estimate ζ. However through the EAT we can use the number of wins of the CHSH
game to prove security.
Before we prove the Lemma 25, we need to show a short technical lemma.
Lemma 24. Let ωAK be a qc-state
ωAK :=
∑
k
pkωA|k ⊗ |k〉〈k |K ,
and A0, A1 be two observables acting on the system A. If we measure the observables according to a random bit
Θ ∈R {0, 1} and store the outcome in a register X, then the conditional Shannon entropy satisfies
H(X |ΘK)ωXΘK ≥
1− ζ
2
, (A6)
where ζ is defined in property 23 and characterizes how much the measurements associated with the observables A0, A1
are compatible.
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Proof. We begin using the definition of the conditional Shannon entropy to write it as,
H(X |ΘK) =
∑
k
pkH(X |ΘK = k). (A7)
Let’s define the effective anti-commutator conditioned on the value K = k as ǫk :=
1
2 tr({A0, A1} ωA|k). Using the
main result from [61] we have,
H(X |ΘK = k) ≥ 1
2
· h
(
1 +
√|ǫk|
2
)
, (A8)
where h(x) := −x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x). Unfortunately this lower bound is a concave function of |ǫk|, and we
will need convexity property, so let’s lower bound it by the largest possible convex function of |ǫk|, namely
H(X |ΘK = k) ≥ 1
2
· h
(
1 +
√|ǫk|
2
)
≥ 1− ǫk
2
. (A9)
Using the last inequality in the equation (A7) we get,
H(X |ΘK) ≥
∑
k
pk
1− |ǫk|
2
=
1−∑k pk|ǫk|
2
. (A10)
For any hermitian operator O and state ω we have that | tr(Oω)| ≤ tr(|O|ω) which implies that∑
k
pk|ǫk| = 1
2
∑
k
pk| tr({A0, A1}ωA|k)| ≤ 1
2
∑
k
pk tr(|{A0, A1}|ωA|k) = 1
2
tr(|{A0, A1}|ωA) = ǫ+ ≤ ζ, (A11)
where the last inequality comes from property 23, and combined with equation (A10) concludes the proof.
Lemma 25. For any of the maps Ni, i ∈ [n] defined in figure 4 we have:
f(q) ≤ inf
ω
H(Xi|ΘiTiK)(Ni⊗1K)(ωRK), (A12)
where f is defined in (A1) and the infimum is taken over all qc-states ωRK such that (Ni ⊗ 1K)(ωRK)Ci = q.
Proof. First we use the fact that Xi = ⊥ when Ti = 1 (this happens with probability µ), which gives us,
H(Xi|ΘiTiK)Ni(ω) = µ H(Xi|ΘiTi = 1K)Ni(ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1− µ) H(Xi|ΘiTi = 0K)Ni(ω) (A13)
= (1− µ) H(Xi|ΘiTi = 0K)Ni(ω) (A14)
Note that for Ti = 0 we have Xi = X
′
i, where X
′
i is Alice’s measurement outcome before she post-processes it (see
step 1e of Protocol 11). Therefore we can say that
H(Xi|ΘiTi = 0K)Ni(ω) = H(X ′i|ΘiTi = 0K)N ′i (ω) (A15)
where N ′i the map representing Alice operations before she post-processes her outputs. Also we know that the
measurement made by her main device is independent from Ti, and then,
H(X ′i|ΘiTi = 0K)N ′i (ω) = H(X ′i|ΘiK)N ′i (ω). (A16)
Now we can use the Lemma 24 and we get,
H(X ′i|ΘiK)N ′i (ω) ≥
1− ζ
2
. (A17)
Rewriting ζ in terms of the CHSH winning probability (see property 23) we have
H(X ′i|ΘiK)N ′i (ω) ≥
1− (4p− 2)√16p(1− p)− 2
2
(A18)
where p is the probability of winning a CHSH game. Note that the bit Ci encodes whether the CHSH game is won,
lost or not played, and then p can be rewritten as p = q(1)1−q(⊥) (which is just the winning probability conditioned
on whether we effectively play the game), where q = (q(0), q(1), q(⊥))t (where t is the transpose) is the probability
distribution on the alphabet of Ci, namely {0, 1,⊥}. Putting the equations (A14), (A15), (A16), and (A18) together
finishes the proof.
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Appendix B: Upper bound on Hmax
In this section we want to upper bound H
ǫ/4
max(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω . To do so we first relate this max-entropy to
H 1
α
(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ and then use Theorem 6 to upper bound the 1α -entropy.
Let us now state some useful lemmas which permit us to relate H
ǫ/4
max(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω with H 1α (Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ.
Lemma 26 ([1], Lemma B.9). For any density operator ω, α ∈]1, 2], and ǫ ∈]0, 1[,
Hǫmax(A|B)ω ≤ H 1α (A|B)ω +
g(ǫ)
α− 1 (B1)
where g(ǫ) := − log(1−√1− ǫ2).
We will also need to relate H 1
α
(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ with H 1α (Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω .
Lemma 27 ([1], Lemma B.5). For a quantum state ωAB on the form ωAB =
∑
x pxωAB|x, where {px} is a probability
distribution on some alphabet X , we have for any x ∈ X and α ∈]1, 2],
H 1
α
(A|B)ω|x ≤ H 1α (A|B)ω +
α
α− 1 log
1
px
. (B2)
Let us now find an upper bound on the max-entropy.
Lemma 28. For a state ρ|Ω, specified by Protocol 11, the max-entropy H
ǫ/4
max(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω satisfies
Hǫ/4max(C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≤ µn+ n(α− 1) log2(7) +
α
α− 1 log
(
1
pΩ
)
− log(1−
√
1− (ǫ/4)2)
α− 1 , (B3)
for α ∈]1, 2] and ǫ ∈]0, 1[, where Ω is the event corresponding to ω ≥ δ and µ is the probability of the round being a
test round (Ti = 1) as described by Protocol 11.
Proof. Indeed, using Lemma 26 we get
Hǫ/4max(C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≤ H 1α (C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω −
log(1−√1− (ǫ/4)2)
α− 1 . (B4)
Now by taking ρ = pΩ · ρ|Ω + (ρ− pΩ · ρ|Ω) and using Lemma 27 we can bound H 1
α
(Xn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω as follows,
H 1
α
(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ|Ω ≤ H 1α (C
n
1 |T n1 K)ρ +
α
α− 1 log
(
1
pΩ
)
. (B5)
Let us use the Theorem 6 n times to upper bound H 1
α
(Xn1 |T n1 K)ρ. First we see that the Markov conditions
∀i ∈ [n], Ci−11 ↔ T i−11 K ↔ Ti
are clearly satisfied, so we can apply the theorem with the following substitution,
∀i ∈ [n], A1 → Ci−11 (B6)
∀i ∈ [n], A2 → Ci (B7)
∀i ∈ [n], B1 → T i−11 K (B8)
∀i ∈ [n], B2 → Ti (B9)
(B10)
and we get
H 1
α
(Cn1 |T n1 K)ρ ≤
∑
i
sup
ωi
H 1
α
(Ci|TiK)ωi (B11)
≤
∑
i
sup
ωi
H(Ci|TiK)ωi + n(α− 1) log2(1 + 2dC) (B12)
24
where dC = 3 is the dimension of Ci, and the second inequality comes from the Lemma 29 below which also imposes
the constraint 1 < α < 1 + 1log(1+2dC) = 1 +
1
log(7) . Because Ci = ⊥ when Ti = 0 (which happens with a probability
1 − µ) we can say that H(Ci|Ti = 0K)ωi = 0, and conditioned on Ti = 1 Ci takes only two values. Then by
decomposing the Shannon entropy we get the following bound,
H(Ci|TiK)ωi = µ ·H(Ci|Ti = 1K)ωi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+(1− µ) ·H(Ci|Ti = 0K)ωi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(B13)
≤ µ. (B14)
Combining equations (B4) (B5) (B12) and (B14) concludes the proof.
Lemma 29 ([1], Lemma B.8). For any state ρAB and for 1 < α < 1 +
1
log(1+2dA)
H 1
α
(A|B)ρ < H(A|B)ρ + (α− 1) log2(1 + 2dA), (B15)
where dA is the dimension of the system A.
Appendix C: Attack against a fully sequential prepare and measure protocol
Here we show an attack where by preparing the state in some way, the adversary can break the non leakage
assumption that no information is transmitted to the adversary. Note that this attack also works in QKD, and
implicitly forces one to assume that the source is isolated from the measurement devices.
In a protocol where Alice produces a new state at each round with a non isolated source, there is a simple attack
which permits Bob to guess Alice’s measurement outcomes Xn1 with probability almost one. Indeed as we allow Bob
to create Alice’s devices (except for the switch which is trusted) Bob can integrate the source in the main device so
that the main device is now allowed to produce the states. In this case (or equivalently if there is full communication
between the source and the main device), for each round i ∈ [n]:
1. Bob asks the main device to produce the state ρAiBi = ΦAiB′i ⊗ |X ′
i−1
1 〉B′′i where ΦAiB′i is an EPR pair, the
register Bi = B
′
iB
′′
i , B
′′
i is a classical register encoding X
′i−1
1 (as defined in the Protocol 11, X
′n
1 is the string
of all measurement outcomes for the rounds k ∈ [i− 1] before Alice post-processes them).
2. He also asks his main device to execute the exact same measurements as the honest ones (described in Protocol
11) on the system Ai, and he asks his testing device to proceed to the honest measurements on the system B
′
i.
3. • If the round i is tested, Bob receives |⊥〉〈⊥| from Alice, so he sets the bit X˜i = ⊥ (because for the testing
rounds j Xj = ⊥).
• If the round is a non-testing round, Bob receives the system Bi = B′iB′′i . Then he reads the classical
system B′′i where the string X
′i−1
1 is encoded so that he can set all the bits X˜j for the subset of the rounds
j ∈ [i−1] that are not tested to X ′j = Xj (indeed for the non-testing rounds k we have Xj = X ′j). Then he
stores the qubit B′i in his one qubit memory he holds (erasing all previous quantum states that he received
previously).
After the duration ∆t Alice sends the list of bases Θn1 to Bob. As soon as Bob receives it he measures the last qubit B
′
j
(j ∈ [n]) he has stored in the corresponding basis Θj , and because the state ρAjB′j is an EPR pair Bob’s measurement
outcome X˜j for the round j is the same as Alice’s one for this round, so we can say that X˜j = Xj .
In the end, if Alice does not abort the protocol, Bob holds a string X˜n1 = X
n
1 . Moreover since the measurements
made by Alice’s devices during the protocol are the exact same as the honest ones, and because they are made on
EPR pairs exactly as in the honest case, the protocol aborts with a probability less than ǫ (see the correctness of the
Protocol 11). This means that Bob guesses Alice’s string Xn1 with a probability at least 1 − ǫ using only one qubit
memory as resource.
Appendix D: Technical lemmas for Position Verification
We prove here two technical lemmas about smooth min-entropy and min-entropy.
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Lemma 30. Let ρXA ∈ S(HXA) be a cq-state on the form ρXA =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρA|x, X some alphabet, and
ǫ ∈ ]0, 1[, then we have
2−Hmin(X|A)ρ − 2−Hǫmin(X|A)ρ ≤ ǫ. (D1)
Proof. First note that by definition of the smooth min-entropy there exists a state ρ¯XA that is ǫ-close to ρXA (in
terms of purified distance) such that
Hmin(X |A)ρ¯ = Hǫmin(X |A)ρ. (D2)
We will then proceed by contradiction and suppose that (D1) is not true meaning that there exists two cq-states
σXA, σ¯XA ∈ S(HXA) such that σ ≈ǫ σ¯, Hmin(X |A)σ¯ = Hǫmin(X |A)σ and
2−Hmin(X|A)σ − 2−Hmin(X|A)σ¯ > ǫ, (D3)
and from that show that there exists a binary measurement which distinguishes σ and σ¯ with a probability Pdist(σ, σ¯) >
1
2 (1 + ǫ) which is a contradiction with the fact that σ ≈ǫ σ¯. Indeed the purified distance upper bounds the trace
distance ∆(σ, σ¯), and Pdist(σ, σ¯) =
1
2 (1 + ∆(σ, σ¯)), so as σ ≈ǫ σ¯ we must have Pdist(σ, σ¯) ≤ 12 (1 + ǫ).
Let us show that such a measurement exists:
First step: Let us consider the POVM F := {FAx , x ∈ X} acting on HA, which maximizes (over the POVMs
{PAx , x ∈ X})
∑
x∈X tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗PAx σXA) being the probability that one guesses the value of X by measuring
σA. In the same way we consider F¯ := {F¯Ax , x ∈ X} the POVM that maximizes
∑
x∈X tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx σ¯XA).
Note that ∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ FAx σXA)−
∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ F¯Ax σ¯XA) (D4)
= max
{PAx ,x∈X}
∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx σXA)− max{PAx ,x∈X}
∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx σ¯XA) (D5)
= 2−Hmin(X|A)σ − 2−Hmin(X|A)σ¯ > ǫ. (D6)
The first equality coming from the definitions of F and F¯ , the second from the operational interpretation of
min-entropy (see property 4), and the final inequality comes from the hypothesis made in (D3).
Second step: We write now the maximun distinguishing probability between σ and σ¯ as:
Pdist(σ, σ¯) := max
{O˜,1−O˜}
[
1
2
(
tr(O˜σ) + tr((1− O˜)σ¯))] (D7)
≥ max
{Px,x∈X}
[
1
2
(
1 + tr(O(σ − σ¯)))] (D8)
=
1
2
(
1 + max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ) − tr(Oσ¯))]
)
(D9)
≥ 1
2
(
1 + max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ)] − max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ¯))]
)
, (D10)
where the maximization in the first line is done over all binary POVMs {O˜,1 − O˜} acting on HAB, and the
maximisation from the second to the last line is done over binary POVMs {O,1−O} such that O is on the form
O =
∑
x∈X |x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx for some POVM {PAx , x ∈ X}. The second line comes from linearity of the trace, the
normalization of the state σ¯, and because we restrict the optimization to a smaller set of POVM. The last line
comes from the fact that for any set Z and any functions f, g : Z 7→ R we have:(
max
z∈Z
f(z)−max
z∈Z
g(z) ≥ 0
)
=⇒
(
max
z∈Z
[f(z)− g(z)] ≥ max
z∈Z
f(z)−max
z∈Z
g(z)
)
,
and the l.h.s. is satisfied because Hmin(X |A)σ¯ = Hǫmin(X |A)σ ≥ Hmin(X |A)σ.
By definition of O we have:
max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ)] − max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ¯)] (D11)
= max
{PAx ,x∈X}
∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx σXA)− max{PAx ,x∈X}
∑
x∈X
tr(|x〉〈x|X ⊗ PAx σ¯XA), (D12)
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and this is just the difference between two guessing probabilities, so it can be rewritten as
max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ)] − max
{Px,x∈X}
[tr(Oσ¯)] = 2−Hmin(X|A)σ − 2−Hmin(X|A)σ¯ > ǫ, (D13)
where the inequality comes from the hypothesis (D3). Inserting the last expression into (D10) shows that the
best guessing probability between σ and σ¯ is Pdist(σ, σ¯) >
1
2 (1 + ǫ), which contradicts that σ ≈ǫ σ¯ and proves
the statement.
We will prove now that if the smooth min-entropy is lower bounded by a linear bound (in n) when ǫ decays
exponentially with n then the guessing probability decays exponentially with n.
Lemma 31. Let ρXn1 A be a cq-state where X
n
1 is a classical register containing n values and A is an arbitrary quantum
system. Then if
∃α,C > 0 : Hǫnmin(Xn1 |A)ρ ≥ Cn (D14)
where ǫn = 2
−αn, then we have (for n big enough)
∃κ : Hmin(Xn1 |A)ρ ≥ κn. (D15)
Proof. By using the previous Lemma 30 and we have,
2−Hmin(X
n
1 |A)ρ ≤ ǫn + 2−H
ǫn
min(X
n
1 |A)ρ (D16)
and because ǫn = 2
−αn and Hǫnmin(X
n
1 |A)ρ ≥ Cn we have
2−Hmin(X
n
1 |A)ρ ≤ 2−αn + 2−Cn ≤ 2−min(α,C)n+1 (D17)
which is equivalent to
Hmin(X
n
1 |A)ρ ≥ κn (D18)
for any 0 < κ < min(α,C) and n big enough.
